Tangents  
New
08 May 99
Copyright © 1999-2003 by S. A. Joyce, all rights reserved.
SPECIAL RESTRICTIONS APPLY.
Edited
27 Aug 99


This is an Internet adaptation of a chapter of an as-yet unpublished book.


My Homespun Humanism

The author feels strongly that this essay should be taken as a whole. Because of its length, however, links to the following sections are provided for the reader's convenience.



 

Introduction

When I read "The Humanist Manifesto" years ago it struck me, frankly, more as an inscribed-in-stone credo to be memorized, than as a dynamic and thoughtful approach to the enhancement of humanity's lot.  Though perhaps such rigid proclamations serve a purpose in stabilizing the direction and focusing the objectives of a group, I do not find them particularly enlightening.  Indeed, to me they are intellectually objectionable, for they do not invite inquiry and participation, but simply pronounce one faction's inflexible, take-it-or-leave-it doctrine, to all points of which one must presumably subscribe in order to receive the official blessing of the group.  If one's own convictions differ in some small way from those espoused, then to that extent one feels excluded.  But then, I suppose I am just one of those contrary individualists, who insists upon doing things his own way, and who requires no one's sanction or approval save his own.
     And so, rather than studying others' writings on the subject, I have gone my own way in devising a style of humanism which works for me.  This effort may well have entailed much duplication of what has already been done, and my ignorance of that body of work has denied me the benefit of the wisdom and experience of others.  Nevertheless, it is occasionally worthwhile to take a fresh and unbiased look at a subject which has perhaps become burdened over the years—as is not uncommon with even the greatest philosophies — with questionable assumptions and shaky reasoning.  Perhaps my individualistic approach constitutes no significant enhancement of established humanistic thought; yet I feel this independent and continuously evolving formulation process has allowed—no, forced—me to become more intimately familiar with the workings of the philosophy, than would have been possible had I contented myself with merely reading other people's thoughts about it.

     I do not require anyone to accept my interpretation of humanism; I offer it only for your consideration and comparison with other views.  If you should discover something of value therein, then that is all that matters.  That having been said, let us move on to the substance of the issue.


 

The Origin of Humanism

The concept of humanism arose in Europe during the Renaissance.  At that time it represented a literary and philosophical focus on classical studies (the humanities), and a return to classically structured ways of thinking (exemplified by the cultures of ancient high civilizations, particularly Greece), as applied to both secular and religious matters of the day.  This led to a reexamination and rethinking of religious scripture and tradition, which subsequently lent considerable impetus to the Protestant Reformation.
     Later, during the period of The Enlightenment in the Eighteenth Century, long-held beliefs and traditions (political as well as religious) were subjected to disciplined scrutiny.  This led to considerable humanistic reform and fostered liberal lines of thought, which ultimately fired the American Revolution and nurtured the idea of government of, by, and for the people.  Since that time humanism has continued to evolve, the term nowadays being applied to fairly diverse fields of thought.  Still, its central themes remain the cultivation of classical studies, reliance upon critical observation and structured reasoning, and the development of a rational basis for enduring human values.  And it is these values upon which we shall now focus.


 

The Premise of Humanism

Humanism is a philosophy which holds that humans, both as individuals and as a species, have inherent value; that each person bears full responsibility for his own actions and for the foreseeable consequences thereof; and that each is deserving, both of praise for behavior which is beneficial to humanity, and of censure for behavior which is detrimental to it.  Humanism prizes individual liberty, the freedom to explore, to question, to learn, to teach, to expand one's mind and to live according to the dictates of personal conscience.  Yet humanism recognizes that freedom is not absolute, that to flourish and endure liberty must be tempered with tolerance, cooperation, and responsibility.
     Humanism comes in both secular and religious varieties, but is not itself a religion.  Basic humanism concerns itself, not with the existence or non-existence of deities, but solely with human behavior, a matter in which we all, believers and non-believers alike, have an interest.  The primary difference between religious humanism and secular humanism lies in the matter of the assumed source of human worth.  Predictably, religious humanism asserts such worth to be divinely bestowed.  Secular humanism holds that humanity has value to us solely because we are human, without regard to any external reference; each of us, by virtue of being human, has a vested interest in the well-being of humanity as a whole.  Because of this difference in primary concept, religious humanism and secular humanism also differ subtly in their philosophical emphases and details of application.  However, in their most important aspect—the objective of employing rational thought for the enhancement of humankind's well-being—they are virtually identical.

     The premise of humanism is fairly straightforward.  Still, many religious people are accustomed to rigid morals based on "commandments" or the like.  To them the concept of a value system based upon reason rather than authoritarian decree is entirely foreign, perhaps even unfathomable.  Though humanism's values (as we shall see) are mostly familiar, its method is not.  It therefore bears a fair bit of explanation.


 

The Purpose of Humanist Values

Humanism's primary objective is the well-being of individual humans through the advancement of humankind as a whole.  This broad concept can be seen as the maximization of long-term benefit to the individuals of our species, both those now living and those of future generations.  By extension, this implies the fostering of institutions and values which tend to preserve and enhance that benefit, the discouraging of attitudes and practices which tend to reduce it, and freedom of choice in matters whose overall beneficial or detrimental effects are unclear or insufficient to justify an abridgment of liberty in their behalf.
     In pursuit of this goal humanism seeks to discover which forms of behavior are demonstrably beneficial, and which detrimental, to our species.  It is these categories, then, to which the humanist perceptions of "good" and "bad" respectively pertain.  Through the objective questioning of why some ideas work and others do not, humanism has reinforced values which have proven beneficial over the centuries, by presenting a rational basis for them.  At the same time it has called into question a number of antiquated values which serve no useful purpose in the current era.  Because outdated standards constitute an unnecessary encroachment upon human liberty (and in some cases are demonstrably harmful), their continued observance and enforcement tends to breed an unhealthy contempt for values in general.  Eliminating arbitrary standards and correcting misdirected ones minimizes this destructive tendency, and helps to restore respect for those behavioral standards whose merits can be demonstrated.
     The full worth of rational values and standards becomes clearer as we follow the process through.  By reinforcing beneficial standards and weeding out those of dubious merit, humanism strives to promote a consistent and viable system of values, which can be shared by all well-meaning people regardless of their religious beliefs or lack thereof.  (Religious factions are, of course, still free to observe their own traditional taboos in addition to these common standards.) The general acceptance of a rational and consistent value system serves to optimize the stability and progressiveness of society and civilization.  Stability provides a structural foundation upon which to organize and build, while progressiveness encourages innovation and development.  Both of these qualities are vital to a healthy society, for stability without progressiveness leads to stagnation, while progressiveness without stability causes civilization to become disorganized and topple.  When balanced, together they enable civilization to function with efficiency and prosperity.  And, when administered with wisdom and foresight, an efficient and prosperous civilization can offer maximum benefit to the individual.

 


 

How Humanist Values Work

But what, exactly, are these "values," "standards," and "benefits" to which we have been alluding?

Values are such moderators of personal conduct as courage, honesty, justice, and tolerance.  Regardless of whether we understand precisely how such qualities might be of value, they are generally conceded to be of great importance in dealing with our fellow humans.  We therefore adopt them in our personal lives, and instill them in our children at an early age.

Standards (of behavior) are laws, morals, and ethics, the various explicit and implicit rules by which we govern ourselves, both as a society and as individuals.  Laws and morals can be thought of as established applications—"Tell the truth," "Don't steal," "Respect the rights of others," etc.—of the more general values.  Though similar to morals, ethics are not fixed standards, but rather direct applications of values to suit individual situations.  Morals have the advantage of being easy to remember and apply in most ordinary situations, whereas ethics offer the flexibility to tailor solutions to complex problems.  To the strict moralist such "situational ethics" might appear to be an open door to a permissive, "anything goes" environment.  Yet ethics firmly based on a rational and uniform code of values are remarkably consistent, enabling us to act fairly in situations in which the application of rigid morality might produce awkward or unjust results.

Benefits are those things which enrich the human experience, which make the world a better place for us and our descendants to live.  Benefits may be tangible, such as personal possessions, a clean environment, and facilities for recreation, communication, transportation, sanitation, and health.  Benefits may also be intangible, such as safety and security, education, a rich heritage of literature and art, and the freedom to speak and believe as we choose.

 

     To understand how values, standards, and benefits are interrelated, let us examine some examples of how specific values work.

Honesty is an example of a humanist value.  No, humanism did not invent honesty, which had been a respected value of many other philosophies long before humanism, as such, arose.  However, humanism recognizes that honesty has worth, not only as an abstract matter of principle, but in a very practical sense.  Honesty fosters trust, and trust improves the efficiency of day-to-day dealings.  Efficiency, in turn, contributes to both the productivity and the stability of civilization.  Productivity enhances prosperity, and hence civilization's potential benefit to the individual; stability enhances people's sense of security, encouraging them to plan for and invest in their future, rather than merely to get by on a day-to-day basis.
     It is not difficult to see that a society in which honesty is not valued—where mistrust and suspicion abound; where fair value is not received for goods and services, or where goods and services received are not worth what is paid for them; where fraud deprives people of their wealth; where widespread theft necessitates diversion of resources into elaborate and costly security measures—would, by denying people the just fruits of their own labor, supply little incentive for people to be productive.  Such a society would obviously be far less efficient and prosperous than one in which honesty is an accepted and expected part of everyone's day-to-day life.

Loyalty is another humanist value.  Again, humanism didn't invent loyalty, but it endorses that quality because of its practical worth.  Loyalty serves the practical purpose of stabilizing society by promoting cohesiveness and trust among its members, thereby reinforcing it against the impact of transient events.  There are many kinds of loyalty—devotion to one's family, group pride in one's employer or school, reverence toward one's religion, dedication to one's principles and philosophy, patriotism toward one's country, and so forth.  Once established, loyalty can withstand a considerable amount of abuse.  Loyalty tends to resist change.  It acts as a social adhesive, strengthening relationships and ideals in society.  It serves to maintain the social fabric in good times and bad, and thus fortifies the structure of civilization itself.
     Yet there is the danger that loyalty, if completely unconditional, can over time become fossilized, in a manner of speaking.  When it becomes too rigid, unquestioning loyalty can work to the detriment of mankind by preserving standards and institutions which no longer serve the best interests of humanity.  For example, continuing blind loyalty to a once beneficent ruler who has become a brutal tyrant serves no purpose—save to encourage brutal tyranny.  By contrast, conditional loyalty, which is not blind but must be earned, is based upon understanding rather than simple custom.  Such earned loyalty establishes a "feedback loop," balancing the needs of the group with those of the individual, and adjusting itself as those needs change.  Though change is resisted, it is not prevented when it becomes necessary.  While strong, conditional loyalty is not rigid; in addition to reinforcing society, it also provides a cushioning effect to ease the way when change is in order.  Instead of preserving outdated standards and institutions to the point of catastrophic failure, conditional loyalty permits gradual and relatively painless change as needed.  The resilient continuity afforded by earned loyalty renders society better able both to weather adversity and to adapt to changing conditions, as the living entity which is humanity grows, learns, and matures.

     As you may already have deduced from these examples, humanistic values are, at their root, nothing more or less than long-term, practical applications of what has been called "enlightened self-interest." This is the foundation of humanist values: that there is nothing which so motivates the constructive behavior of a thoughtful person, religious or not, as the realization that the consequences of his actions ultimately affect his own well-being!
     Other values embraced by humanism include charity, compassion, courage, foresight, industry, integrity, justice, moderation, patience, scholarship, tenacity, and tolerance.  Each of these receives humanism's endorsement because it can be logically shown to contribute to the advancement of mankind, and hence to humans as individuals.  Even so, humanism considers these values as guidelines, not as inflexible absolutes to be applied under all circumstances.  Remember, humanism is founded upon benefit to humanity, and often there arise situations in which the pat application of some values may produce more harm than benefit.  (For example, although our dear Aunt Gertrude might be unspeakably ugly, telling her so would only hurt her feelings without yielding any benefit; we see, therefore, that unbridled honesty is not always the best policy.) Moreover, various values (compassion and justice, for example) sometimes conflict with each other, and an optimum balance must be sought.  Therefore humanist values are tempered by reason, according to the relative help or harm each may produce in a given situation.

     At this point it is evident that these values embraced by enlightened self-interest are the same as those which most people associate with good citizenship.  A curious coincidence?  Not at all!  A society which genuinely prizes individual freedom (as opposed to one which merely pays it lip service) must embrace policies which truly produce beneficial results and reject those which merely seek to control for control's sake.  Beneficial results, in turn, serve both to illuminate what is "good" citizenship and to motivate self-interest.  Thus we see that enlightened self-interest and citizenship, far from opposing each other, are actually complementary.  Those values, which strengthen the worthwhile objectives of society without encroaching unnecessarily upon liberty, ultimately work to the individual's self-interest by enhancing society's benefit to him.  Understanding this, the enlightened citizen voluntarily shoulders his responsibilities in his own long-term interest.

 

Are there any values which are not humanistic?  Certainly!  Let us consider one example.

Piety is commonly considered a virtue by religious folk, but it is not a humanist value.  Why?  Because, although some religions contend that it improves one's chances for a pleasant afterlife, piety cannot rationally be shown to promote the well-being of humanity here on Earth.  Contrary to the practice of humanism, which evaluates ideas in light of supporting and conflicting evidence, piety conditions people to accept or reject ideas solely on the basis of authority and tradition.
     In practice this usually works out tolerably well, in promoting the acceptance and use of uniform moral standards in everyday situations.  However, by forbidding the asking of "impious" questions, and by relieving people of the need to think for themselves, the pious mind-set tends to breed both ignorance of things beyond one's personal experience and a general inability to deal rationally with complex or unusual situations.  By reinforcing habits of reverent behavior and unquestioning faith, piety's effect is to promote both the individual's obedience to authority and his reliance upon it.
     Obviously this is good for the religious establishment, not only because dependent people are more compliant and easily controlled, but because the church tends to benefit financially from the gratitude of individuals whom it helps, even if often the only "help" it can offer is comfort.  But it is not so good for people, whose ability to deal rationally with complex situations and urgent problems on their own is systematically eroded by the cultivation of such habits and attitudes.  In the long view, then, piety serves the cause of organized religion, not that of humanity.  Still, under normal conditions its beneficial and detrimental effects usually tend to strike an approximate balance.  Though piety stifles inquiry and hampers innovation, it enhances social stability.  Thus, under ordinary circumstances, piety could almost be viewed as a "neutral" value from a humanistic standpoint.

     However, in some instances piety has been known to have decidedly detrimental effects.  Consider, for example, the uncounted acts of torture and execution, of people accused of such "crimes" as heresy, blasphemy, and witchcraft, by agents of the pious clergy during the Holy Inquisitions of Europe.  At that time the motivation of piety demanded that human blood be shed for no greater offense than telling the truth as one saw it.  Thus, though the Christian Church had often denounced ritual human sacrifice among "heathens" as savage and ungodly, it was in effect committing that very same act in the name of piety!  Far from advancing the cause of humanity, the piety of the Holy Inquisition had the effect of pushing conditions in Europe back to the level of primitive superstition, ignorance, and fear.  There was nothing humanistic in that effort, and we can all be thankful that it ultimately failed.  (Or did it?  Even today there are some who would delight in putting, not only all knowledge acquired since the Middle Ages, but even those who study and teach it, to the torch!)


 

Humanism, Society, and the Individual

Humanism, like nihilism, exalts the individual; its ultimate objective is his benefit, and is based on the assumption that people, adequately informed, will act in their own self-interest.  But unlike nihilism, which focuses solely upon the individual, humanism acknowledges that humans are social animals, and that the individual's greatest potential can be realized, not through a disorganized, egoistic, everyone-for-himself approach, but only through a degree of cooperation with his fellows.
     This does not mean that we undertake all tasks as a group, nor does it propose the subjugation of the individual to the group.  It simply acknowledges that there are substantial benefits which only a healthy society can offer to the individual—benefits which require extensive training, specialization, cooperation, and organization, as well as elaborate facilities, and which therefore cannot materialize through the resources of single individuals acting independently.  For to achieve our current living standard we humans have had to become a species of specialists.  Even the most dedicated hermit does not mine and smelt his own minerals, forge his own tools, mill his own lumber, make his own clothes, nails, and paper, brew his own beer, concoct his own medicines, generate his own electricity, and raise all his own food.  (He might do some of these things, but not all of them.  No individual can be entirely self-sufficient, rejecting all benefits and products of civilization, unless he is willing to lower his living standard to a truly primitive level.) Thus, in order to achieve its primary goal of benefiting the individual, humanism must also accomplish the intermediate objective of preserving and enhancing society.
     In recognition of this, the enlightened individual finds it in his own long-term interest to shoulder his modest share of the responsibility toward this end.  For the more productive and healthy society is, the greater the benefit it can return to the individual.  On the other hand, if an individual strives only for his own narrow, short-term interests, and in so doing harms or becomes a burden upon society in some way, then the overall benefit which society returns to all individuals is correspondingly diminished.  Hence the individual ultimately does a disservice to himself and his descendants if he behaves in a manner detrimental to society.

     My own view of humanism is clearly oriented toward the individual.  Some, however, may prefer an alternate view, that humanism's primary objective is the well-being of society, and that benefit to the individual is secondary to that.  Either way, the two go hand in hand.  If something benefits society (and harms no one), then the individual also benefits; if something benefits individuals (and harms no one), then society also benefits.  As long as all pertinent factors are taken into account, humanism works both ways to all effects, with only a minor difference in emphasis.


 

Altruism as an Extension of Self-interest

If all this business of enlightened self-interest seems reminiscent of Ayn Rand's objectivism, that is not an entirely inaccurate assessment.  Yes, there is a solidly rational, non-supernatural basis for promoting certain standards of behavior.  And yes, the interests of humans, both as individuals and as a group, are in accord with those standards.  But it is important to understand that self-interest is not the same as selfishness, and an illustrative example should help to clarify that point.
     Whereas Rand rejected altruism—the doing of kind deeds simply for the sake of doing them and without hope of reward—as inconsistent with self-interest, I do not.  Granted, there is some question as to whether any act can be truly and completely altruistic.  For even in the absence of material gain or sensory pleasure, the pleasant inner feeling which comes from doing a kindness is motivation in itself to many.  I do not dispute this.  However, I will stipulate that altruism, as I employ the term here, applies to beneficent deeds for which the doer does not consciously expect any external reward, tangible or intangible, regardless of whether he anticipates some self-gratification from the doing of them.  (In this sense, altruism can be thought of as the antithesis of malice—the doing of harmful deeds, not for personal gain or even for recognition, but for the sheer, perverse delight of causing damage and suffering.)
     While altruism is not uncommon on an individual-to-individual basis, it is relatively rare on a larger scale.  Major businesses often contribute to community projects, for example, yet it is almost always done with some self-serving objective in mind—perhaps bolstering the well-being of the community with the expectation that the business leader himself will reap some benefit as a member of that community, or perhaps simply the enhancement of the business's image in the eyes of potential customers.  Yet large-scale altruism does occasionally occur, and when it does it is often of momentous benefit to society.

     Let us take the case of John D.  Rockefeller as an example.  Rockefeller spent the first part of his life as a hard-nosed, tight-fisted empire builder in the oil industry.  But as he amassed his wealth, he drove himself as mercilessly as he drove others.  Though by the time he was in his early fifties he was immensely wealthy and powerful, Rockefeller was a friendless, shriveled, bitterly misanthropic husk of a man, the public, his associates, his family, and even his own body revolting against him.
     Yet just as he was on the verge of becoming a permanent invalid with but a short time to live, he executed a turnaround in his life.  Rockefeller began channeling his hoarded millions into all sorts of benevolent projects, from rescuing faltering colleges to battling disease.  What was his motivation?  We know that, following the initiation of his new philanthropic pursuits, both his disposition and his health began to improve.  Much to his own surprise, not to mention that of his physicians, it soon became evident that Rockefeller had acquired a new lease on life; he would live another forty years! That would certainly have constituted sufficient motivation to continue the course.  Yet what persuaded him to change course in the first place?  Could it be that in the back of old John D.'s mind was the spark of a final selfish thought, that funding education and health care would be a way to foster a more productive and more affluent public, whose enhanced purchasing power would ultimately be used to buy more oil from his refineries?  That would have been cold, calculating objectivism at work — except that such a project would have taken decades to bear fruit, and prior to his turnaround Rockefeller's doctors had given him but months to live at most.
     No, John D.  Rockefeller was literally at a dead end, possessed of all the wealth and power any man could desire, yet bereft of health, happiness, hope—and time.  Perhaps in his desperation he had the curious notion that by using this wealth and power to make others happy he might, in his remaining days, buy himself some small measure of satisfaction from that enterprise.  Perhaps he was then so astounded by the unexpected magnitude of the inner gratification yielded by such an act that, once started, he decided to continue and expand his philanthropy.  Whether or not Rockefeller perceived that he himself would benefit from it, his altruism benefited millions, both during his own time and long after his death.  However serious his earlier faults might have been, the millions of dollars which Rockefeller invested in the future of America's people has, over the years, been paid back many thousand-fold, not just in increased earning and buying power, but in the enhancement of the ability of average citizens to realize their dreams.

     Acts such as these, whether great or small, whether selfishly or unselfishly motivated, make the world a more agreeable place to live.  Perhaps Rockefeller envisioned that someone much like his younger self would, through the judicious use of these gifts, someday achieve even greater heights than Rockefeller himself had reached, without falling victim to the perils along the way.  Yes, even this is a form of self-interest, but in an extended sense, the sense in which the concept of "self" embraces not only the individual but the society of which one is a part as well.  That is when civilization, because of a magnanimous act, goes beyond merely sustaining itself, beyond even growing and prospering, to truly flowering.


 

Making Humanism Work

So far we have become acquainted with the ideals of humanism.  Unfortunately, that is as far as many philosophies go.  For even a perfect theory is ultimately worthless unless it can be made to work for imperfect people in an imperfect world.  Having set forth their pretty principles on paper, many theorists display a disappointing inability to put their ideas into a form which actually works in real life.  That is a problem common to many "pure" theories, even those as diverse as communism, democracy, and anarchy.  Unless modified to account for real-world factors, they simply break down when applied to situations outside the idealistic textbook conditions under which they were conceived.  If humanism is to be of any real value to us, then, it must acquire the necessary "nuts and bolts" to bridge the gap from paper to practice.  Without this crucial step, even the greatest philosophy remains nothing more than a topic for dull books, pointless lectures, and idle parlor chat — or at most a colossal failure, such as Soviet-style communism.

     Now let us see what is required to get humanism off the drawing board and transform it into a practical, working system.  First, a brief reexamination of the humanist ideal of behavior, using honesty as an example, will acquaint us with the problem: The humanist understands that dishonest acts, whether perpetrated by others or by himself, cause the overall level of trust in society to be lessened to some degree.  It follows that the stability and prosperity of society, and hence the ultimate benefit which the individual himself receives from being a part of it, are correspondingly diminished by such acts.  The humanist therefore chooses to act honestly, even if that means foregoing a short-term personal gain.
     That is the theory, at any rate.  Obviously it does not always work in the real world, and this is a problem which must be addressed.  Granted, most of us, whether religious or not, earnestly try to adopt effective values for ourselves, and to instill them in our children; this is the necessary first step toward making any value system a viable reality.  But despite our best intentions and efforts, the fact remains that not everyone is thoughtful and ethical.  Even those who are may at times be sorely tempted when the prospect of short-term personal gain overwhelms the vision of long-term societal benefit.  Moreover, even values based on fact and reason may vary somewhat from one person to the next, and such inconsistencies can be a source of social friction.  To address situations in which personal ethics may be inadequate to induce appropriate behavior, then, society has found it necessary to make and enforce rules.

     (At this juncture we may encounter protest from the libertarian quarter.  But we must remind ourselves that, while the concept of "zero government" might be a marvelous idea on paper, such an idealistic system requires the existence and unanimous cooperation of an ideal populace — perfect people.  It is a beautiful concept, but it lacks the aforementioned "nuts and bolts" to connect it to the real world.  For this reason anarchy does not work in practice — as its most famous proponent, Thomas Jefferson, discovered to his dismay upon becoming the third President of the United States.  If actually attempted, a pure anarchy's realistic life expectancy would be the time it takes the first bully to decide to impose his will upon everyone else — a matter of minutes, days at most.  At that point anarchists are confronted with a choice between submitting to domination or organizing to resist it.  In either case individuals must cede at least a portion of their liberty, either to the bully or to the group.  And with that act, anarchy becomes essentially defunct.)

     And so governments are instituted among humans.  We might not like them, but they are a practical necessity if we hope to maintain a living standard above the hunter-gatherer level.  Though far from perfect, the most humanism-friendly form of government devised so far is the constitutional democratic republic.  Indeed, the first modern example of this form, the United States of America, was in large part a product of the humanist movement known as The Enlightenment.
     Pure democracy is a theoretically ideal system, but in practice it is unworkable in societies of more than a few hundred individuals, especially where those individuals represent a broad spectrum of backgrounds, abilities, and interests.  The constitutional democratic republic overcomes many of the difficulties of pure democracy, transforming the glowing principle into a feasible system.  A well written constitution sets forth the obligations and limits of government, as well as the essential rights of individuals of both majority and minority factions.  A republic reduces inefficiency to a tolerable degree by having day-to-day decisions made by elected representatives rather than by mass vote.  Although it is at times agonizingly cumbersome and inefficient, the electoral process enables the people to maintain a yoke upon government power, and to exercise collective control of its general policies and direction.  Hence it is both the right and the responsibility of all of us regularly to remind those in positions of authority that their legitimate function is to serve us with a minimum of well considered laws, not to dominate us with a plethora of arbitrary or abusive ones.  Obviously, it is also our duty to keep ourselves well informed and fair minded, so that government will reflect our collective wisdom rather than our factional folly and greed.


 

When Bad Ideas Become Law

All too frequently governments, even elected ones, ostensibly acting on behalf of society, enact unwise laws.  Even lawmakers who are truly well-meaning may be misinformed, short-sighted, or biased.  Consequently they may enact statutes which have no real benefit, or which may even be harmful.  After all, even the fairest and wisest leaders cannot be both impartial and expertly informed about all matters which may demand their attention.  And so it is our duty as citizens to be watchful of the laws which our leaders enact, and to call them to task when it appears that their actions have been imprudent.  For even if a law is essentially neutral, having neither beneficial nor detrimental effects, the very abridgment of individual liberty which the law imposes is in itself a detriment, both to the individual and, by extension, to society as a whole.  Moreover, the proliferation of laws which offer no clear benefit tend to breed disrespect for law in general.  And so it can be argued that only laws which benefit society and individuals are good laws; laws which offer no benefit, even if they do no direct harm, are bad and ought not to be on the books.
     History has shown that laws which forbid and punish such acts as treason, murder, theft, and fraud have promoted the stability of civilization and secured its benefits to the individual.  Laws restricting the release of poisons into the soil, water, and air, though sometimes imposing expense or short-term inconvenience upon business and industry, have undeniably contributed to the long-term health of practically everyone (including businessmen and industrialists).  Beyond the question of fundamental values, too, laws ensuring that people are adequately educated before entering the workplace have proven their worth, by making for both a more productive labor force and a better informed and more affluent consumer base.  It is also clear that the general adoption of other standards, such as systems of measurement and monetary exchange, has made production and commerce much simpler and more efficient than it would be if everyone used his own weights, measures, and media of exchange.  Even uniform traffic laws make it not only possible, but easy, to survive a cross-country trip.

     But there are other laws, perhaps enacted on the basis of misinformation or merely to enforce popular taboos, whose benefits to the general public are questionable to non-existent.  For example, why should it be illegal for sunbathers and swimmers to remove their clothes on a beach?  What is accomplished by prohibiting the sale of alcoholic beverages one day each week?  What benefit does mankind derive from criminalizing certain kinds of sexual behavior, even for married couples?  What is the rationale behind subsidizing the farming of tobacco and simultaneously attempting to discourage its consumption?  Why is cannabis, now known to have therapeutic effects as well as being far less harmful than some legal drugs such as tobacco, still banned for use even by the medical profession?
     One would be hard pressed to demonstrate, solely on the basis of evidence and reason, a clear benefit from the perpetuation of such laws, either to individuals or to society.  Yet there are those who, citing only the "reasons" of custom and tradition (i.e., no valid reason at all) or religious doctrine (in violation of the First Amendment), insist that such laws should remain on the books, and that people should be penalized for disobeying them, despite lack of evidence of real harm, or even threat of harm, to anyone.  For this reason responsible citizens must continually question the laws which their leaders impose, and demand from them that every law either serve a demonstrably beneficial purpose or be stricken from the books.  As individuals we might not always agree as to which laws are truly beneficial, but under our collective pressure for objective legislation the long term trend should be toward better, fairer, and fewer laws.


 

Where Do We Go From Here?

Though humanism's rational methods might be unfamiliar to many, its values have long been an integral (if at times neglected) component of most people's morals and ethics, whether they realize it or not.  Far from posing a threat to conventional values, then, by providing a rational basis for those values humanism actually reinforces them.  Indeed, perhaps the best thing about humanism is that its implementation requires neither a bloody war of revolution nor a wrenching revolution of ideology.  It demands only a bit of education and redirection, plus the realization that, despite differences in belief and culture, we all share a common interest in humanity's well-being.  We need not abolish tradition, but simply learn to recognize the distinction between taboos and rational standards of behavior, and resolve to apply them accordingly.  We need not overthrow our form of government, but simply demand that our elected servants acknowledge and adhere to those humanistic principles, both religious and secular, which spawned it.
     To a great extent our quality of life depends upon the enactment and general observance of those wise and just laws which provide demonstrable benefit.  And the very stability of civilization demands that we be cautious about tinkering with those ideals which have served us well for centuries.  At the same time, though, our time and resources are too precious to squander on the preservation and enforcement of foolish or outdated laws, whose needlessly restrictive and otherwise harmful effects outweigh any supposed benefits, and hence breed disrespect for law in general.  While we are wise to learn lessons from the past, we cannot permanently anchor public morals to the inflexible taboos of ancient times.  For whether we like it or not, humanity is on a grand voyage of exploration driven by the inexorable tides and winds of discovery and learning.  It will not tarry long in any harbor, and (barring global catastrophe) will never return to its port of origin.

     It is time for a pragmatic and thoughtful view, drawing not only upon our experience of the past, but also upon our knowledge of the present, and upon our visions and hopes for the future.  In an era of exponentially expanding knowledge—much of which can be dangerous if unwisely used—it is essential that we adopt a foresighted approach to our problems and aspirations based upon what actually works, rather than a backward one based upon archaic tradition.  Humanism, whether secular, religious, or neutral, offers one way—and perhaps the most desirable in the long term, considering the available alternatives.  Alive as the human mind itself, humanism is flexible and adaptable enough to grow along with our species, yet is stoutly resistant to idle whim and caprice.  Let the religions of the world enforce their ancient taboos upon those who voluntarily commit to them.  But let public laws and values be illuminated by current knowledge, animated by foresight, and tempered by experience.  Let our efforts be directed toward building a strong yet resilient framework, not a rigid cage, for civilization.

= SAJ =




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